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The Case Against Stock in Public Pension Funds
Lawrence N. Bader and Jeremy Gold
Abstract

A government has $1 million of stock in a pension fund that covers its employees. The
liability can be matched with a $1-million dedicated bond portfolio. What are the
consequences of shifting the pension fund from equities to bonds? The paragraph above
duplicates the opening paragraph of The Case Against Stock in Corporate Pension Funds
(Bader 2003), except that we have substituted a governmental plan for a corporate plan.
Does this substitution matter?
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1. Introduction
Invoking a transparent accounting framework based on economics rather than actuarial
and accounting traditions 1 , Bader (2003) concludes that shifting the corporate plan investments
from equities to bonds adds value for shareholders (a tax arbitrage gain) and for participants (a
benefit security gain).
Many actuaries and others believe that the Bader (2003) reasoning is irrelevant to
governmental pension funds for various reasons:
• Governments have no shareholders.
• Governments pay no Federal taxes.
• The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is not rushing towards a transparent
economic accounting model.
• Taxpayers may escape a troubled local pension plan by moving, whereas corporate
shareholders must find buyers for their shares.
• The indefinite lifetime of governmental pension plans suggests the possibility of
intergenerationa l risk sharing that can deliver the equity risk premiums without
commensurate risk.
Nonetheless, we show in Section 2 (risk-adjusted costs) and Section 3 (tax effects) that
parallel reasoning leads to parallel conclusions: in a transparent financial environment, shifting
governmental pension fund investments from equities to bonds adds value for local taxpayers (a
Federal tax arbitrage gain). To the extent that the governmental pension plan has default risk,
there would also be a security gain – but we ignore any such risk in this paper. We also observe
that equity investment by governmental plans involves many risks besides the market risks:
intergenerational taxpayer conflicts (risk transfers masquerading as risk sharing), undercharges
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to employees’ compensation packages for the value of the pensions, employee claims on pension
surplus, and higher governmental borrowing costs.
In Section 4 we observe that the practical obstacles to an all-bond strategy in public
pension plans are greater than those that apply in a corporate setting. Nonetheless, economic
analysis suggests that shunning equities helps local taxpayers in much the same ways that
corporate all-bond strategies aid shareholders.

In Section 5 we consider how public plan sponsors and their actuaries can prepare for
changes that will eventually follow the move towards greater transparency. Sponsors should
become more cautious in granting benefits and setting investment strategies. Public plan
actuaries, like their corporate brethren, must master the anti-equity reasoning (whether or not
they or their clients are persuaded); ignorance will not lead to bliss.
Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Public Pension Plans: Assumptions and Basic Illustrative Plan
We apply the term “public pension plans” to defined benefit pension plans that cover the
employees of local (state or municipal) governments. We assume that the government will not
default on its pension obligations. The primary reason to pre-fund the plan, then, is to ensure that
each taxpayer generation pays the full cost of the services it receives (Peskin 2001). A further
goal of funding is to minimize the cost to taxpayers on an economic basis that properly accounts
for risks assumed and taxes paid.
We assume complete transparency, in which
• Buyers of the government’s bonds understand how the pension plan affects the value and risk
of those bonds, and
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• Taxpayers recognize that their financial position includes exposure to their pro rata shares of
the public plan’s pension assets and liabilities.
Although taxpayers neither own the public pension plan’s assets nor owe its liabilities,
we may characterize their relationship to the plan’s performance as exposure: we say that
someone is “exposed” to a market risk (and potential reward) if that person’s wealth will be
greater or lesser depending on the outcome of that risk. Share ownership, for example, works
exactly like this. But direct ownership is not the only kind of exposure. If, for example, “Mr. C”
(the current owner of an asset) agrees to transfer the asset to “Ms. F” (the future owner) one year
from now at a price set today, Ms. F is immediately exposed to the changing asset value, despite
Mr. C’s continuing legal title.
We recognize that real-world pension plans are not transparent – far from it. Stakeholders
and decision- makers, today and in the foreseeable future, appraise these plans through dark
screens that disguise risk, misvalue pension promises, and produce expedient but flawed
decisions. We use the transparency assumption not to portray current reality, but rather to guide
us in analyzing how public pension plans would be financed if all principals fully understood
their exposure.
We initially ignore all taxes other than those paid to the local government for pension
plans. In effect, each taxpayer is deemed to pay his share of the plan contributions.
We use a highly simplified example, with a single governmental employee, a single
current taxpayer – Mr. C – and a single future taxpayer 20 years from now – Ms. F. For services
during the current year, a portion of the employee’s pay is awarded in the form of a $1,000 lump
sum payable in 20 years. This “pension” is immediately vested and is payable whether or not the
employee survives for 20 years.
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Immunization. Suppose that a 20- year zero-coupon Treasury bond is currently priced to return
5% annually. Such a bond maturing for $1,000 would cost $377. So the government should pay
the employee $377 less in salary than it would pay in the absence of the pension promise. It can
then invest $377 in the 20-year Treasury bond, and the transaction is fair to all. The employee
effectively gets a $377 bond instead of $377 of direct pay. Mr. C pays $377 of taxes that cover
the employee’s pension; in fact, he doesn’t care whether the employee receives the pension or
simply receives extra pay of $377. Ms. F, who will replace Mr. C as the sole taxpayer at some
point during the next 20 years, is unaffected by the pension promise.
2. Risk-Adjusted Plan Cost (ignoring taxes)
In this section, we show that:
• Investing in equities does not reduce the plan cost below the immunization level ($377).
Any actuarial cost reduction based on the higher expected returns of equities is a zero-sum game
across taxpayer generations. Undercharging an early generation raises the
risk-adjusted cost for later generations.
• In some cases the extra cost borne by later generations provides windfalls to employees, rather
than to earlier taxpayer generations.
• Once each generation’s taxpayers pay the correct (immunized) cost, pension fund equity
investment is no better than similar exposures in their personal portfolios.
2.1 Does Investing in Equity Reduce the Cost of a Fixed Promise?
Suppose that equities have an expected return of 8%. Then an investment of only $215 in
equities would be expected to grow to $1,000 in 20 years and satisfy the liability. So our current
taxpayer Mr. C might prefer to pay only $215 toward the pension and have it invested in
equities. This may appear fair when we argue that twenty years is a long time, the pension plan
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seems well able to tolerate risk and, on average, the plan will meet the obligation. We will see,
however, that Mr. C’s apparent $162 “saving” is really a transfer of wealth from Ms. F to Mr. C.
Because the pension fund equities might earn more or less than 8%, we need a method
for dealing with such investment gains and losses. For now, we assume that gains and losses do
not affect the employee – he will not suffer from any shortfall (the pension is certain) and he will
not share in any surplus.
Suppose that Ms. F becomes responsible for all future gains and losses immediately after
Mr. C pays his $215 to the plan. At the 20- year point, Ms. F will pay additional taxes if the plan
assets are less than $1000 and she will receive a tax rebate for any excess. On average, she will
break even. How will she regard this situation at time zero?
Suppose that Ms. F has an optimal personal portfolio of equities and bonds. By this we
mean that although she could expect to add return by taking on more risk, her risk preference
makes any such trade-off unattractive to her.
Consider how the pension plan changes her exposure – including both her directly owned
assets and her responsibility for the pension plan. By making the pension promise, the
government has in effect sold a $377 Treasury bond from her portfolio. It has also added $215 of
equities to her portfolio.
Remember that her previous position was optimal for her risk preference. That is, she
would not have wanted to exchange $377 of bonds for $377 of equity. What the pension plan has
done is far worse; it has exchanged $377 of bonds for $215 of equity!
How can Ms. F restore the risk level that she previously carried? She could sell $215 of
equities from her personal portfolio and pay $377 for a zero-coupon Treasury to cover the
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pension promise. She would thereby hedge her responsibility for the governmental plan and
reduce her equity exposure to its previous level. Unfortunately, she’ll be out of pocket $162.
What has happened here? The $215 of equities was bought in the expectation of earning
3% risk premiums (8% expected return versus the certain 5% Treasury yield). Mr. C took credit
for the expected risk premiums, but bore no risk. Ms. F bears the risk, but has no expected risk
premiums. (She may win or lose, but her expected gain/loss is zero.) Risk carries a price in the
markets, and the market price to dispose of Ms. F’s risk is $162. So there is no overall gain from
the equity investment; the initial $162 “saving” enjoyed by Mr. C is simply an intergenerational
transfer of cost in the form of risk.
2.2 Who Wins What Ms. F. Loses?
Another danger to the taxpayers is the possibility of under-pricing the pension promise to
the employee. If the government is funding only $215, it is natural for the employee and the plan
sponsor to regard that amount as the correct cost of the pension promise. The employee may
receive the pension promise in exchange for $215 of direct pay rather than $377. In this event,
Ms. F is still forced to bear $162 of uncompensated risk. But it is the employee rather than Mr. C
who benefits at her expense.
Using an actuarial assumption that anticipates only a portion of the risk premium doesn’t
solve the problem. For example, using a 7% return assumption rather than 8% would raise the
initial investment from $215 to $258. Because the $258 is still expected to earn 8% annually,
Ms. F would now expect to come out ahead relative to the $377 bond/pension promise. But again
recall that with her previously optimal portfolio, she had all the risk she wanted and was
unwilling to exchange $377 of bonds for $377 of equity. $258 of equity is clearly insufficient.
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She is still exposed to a risk that she wasn’t previously bearing, and would need $377 to be able
to restore her original position.
Similarly, keeping Mr. C exposed for some period (but not the full 20 years) doesn’t
solve the problem. Ms. F must step into the shoes of Mr. C with enough money to cover the price
of the hedging Treasury bond. Otherwise the expected rewards of her position are less than the
market provides for the risk she is assuming, and she cannot execute a market transaction to
remove the risk without digging into her own pockets.
So, our requirement of fairness between taxpayer generations forbids Mr. C from
anticipating risk premiums and requires him to fund the full $377 value of the pension promise
discounted at the riskless rate. Note that the unfairness stems from the amount funded, not the
choice of investment. With the plan’s $377 invested in equities, Ms. F could accept the risk and
the expected tax refund when the pension is paid, or she could hedge the risk in her own
portfolio.
2.3 Is Investing in Equity Advantageous After Paying the Full Riskless Plan Cost?
Once the full $377 cost is paid, is there any advantage in investing that money in
equities? Mr. C cannot (fairly) benefit by anticipating risk premiums, but he can benefit from the
risk premiums once they are earned. We can consider three cases here, depending on how Mr. C
and Ms. F share the risks and rewards.
Case 1: A Single Generation. The simplest case occurs when our two taxpayers are the same
person – that is, Mr. C will be around for the full 20 years and will absorb all gains and losses
during that period.
We suppose that before the pension plan was set up (or befo re the plan sponsor decided
to invest in equities rather than the Treasury bond), Mr. C had a personal portfolio of equities
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and bonds that was optimal for his risk preference. The pension fund has now added a leveraged
equity position in which Mr. C owes the $1,000 future pension and owns the $377 equity
portfolio. To restore his previous optimal position, he must sell $377 of equities from his
personal portfolio and buy the hedging Treasury bond to cover the pension. His total portfolio is
now back in its previous position, considering both the securities that he owns directly and his
exposure to the pension fund.
Clearly Mr. C enjoys no direct profit from this overall restructuring. The pension fund
gains or losses that he experiences would, without the restructuring, have occurred in his
personal portfolio. (We consider some secondary effects in Section 3.)
Proponents of equity investment by public pension plans often assert that the long
duration of the plans permits intergenerational risk-sharing that can take advantage of an alleged
tendency of equity market risk to diminish over time. So for the next two cases, we return to our
two-taxpayer structure, with Ms. F stepping into the shoes of Mr. C after some portion of the 20year plan lifetime.
Case 2: Immediate Recognition of Gains and Losses. First we suppose that the gains and
losses are immediately covered by an adjustment in the taxes levied by the plan sponsor. Plan
surplus (relative to the price of the hedging Treasury bond) is removed from the pla n and
refunded to the taxpayer du jour 2 . Deficits are corrected by immediate additional taxes.
With this immediate recognition, Mr. C would, while he remained responsible for the
pension fund’s gains and losses, be in the same position as in Case 1 above. He would offset the
pension fund’s leveraged equity holding by the opposite transaction in his personal portfolio, and
his total portfolio would be unaffected by the pension fund’s decision to invest in equities.
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Ms. F would also be unaffected. When she assumes responsibility for the pension plan,
the plan’s assets and liabilities would be equal and she could offset them in her personal
portfolio.
Case 3: Spread Recognition of Gains and Losses. Now suppose that, under more conventional
actuarial procedures, gains and losses are amortized over an extended period. For illustration, we
assume amortization in equal installments (plus interest) over the 10 years following each year’s
gain or loss.
Let us temporarily suppose that the two taxpayers select a date fo r the handoff of
responsibility for the pension plan, with no option on either side to back out and no
compensation at that time for the condition of the pension fund. For illustration, we set the
handoff date at 6 years from now.
When Mr. C leaves, then, 50% of the first-year gain or loss will have been paid off (5
years’ worth of installments following the first-year occurrence). The remaining 50% becomes
the responsibility of Ms. F. Mr. C will have amortized 40% of the second- year gain or loss, with
60% passing to Ms. F – and so forth.
Current Taxpayer Viewpoint. Does the spreading of gains and losses to Ms. F benefit Mr.
C by reducing his downside risk on the equity performance? No! Because the spreading is
symmetrical, his potential risk premiums are reduced in the same proportion as his risk. He will
receive, eventually, 50% of the first-year gain or loss. With respect to that year, his situation is
the same as if the fund held only 50% equity rather than 100% – and that is how he should adjust
his personal portfolio if he wishes to offset the pension fund’s equity exposure. With respect to
the second year, he receives, eventually, 40% of the gain or loss; he can readjust his personal
portfolio during the second year accordingly.
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Future Taxpayer Viewpoint. Ms. F’s position is also fair at time zero. She will receive
50% of the first-year gain or loss, 60% of the second, etc. She can offset this exposure in her
personal portfolio.
Handoff date not known in advance. Now suppose that Mr. C and Ms. F do not know the
handoff date in advance, but agree that Ms. F will accept without compensation the surplus or
deficit at the time of the handoff. Or, equivalently, suppose that Ms. F is replacing Mr. C without
any financial dealings between them – for example, Ms. F is succeeding Mr. C as a renter. Then
it is not clear in advance how much pension fund exposure is falling on each taxpayer, and they
cannot accurately hedge their individual exposures. But, assuming that the amortization of gains
and losses is symmetrical, Mr. C will ultimately realize a certain percentage of the risks taken
during his tenure, and the identical percentage of the risk premiums earned. There is an
intergenerational sharing of risk, and a commensurate sharing of rewards, so the arrangement is
fair. But the sharing does not give the parties any better risk/reward balance than either could get
alone in the capital markets.
The situation might be different if the handoff is not prearranged but simply a chance
event that occurs, for example, when Ms. F buys Mr. C’s home or business. With full
transparency, we may suppose that the two taxpayers will recognize the value of future taxes
associated with the pension plan in their sale negotiation. Then Mr. C can negotiate a higher sale
price in recognition of pension surplus, or Ms. F can obtain a price concession in recognition of a
pension deficit. In that situation, Mr. C has the full risks and rewards of the pension fund
performance during his holding period, regardless of the gain/loss spreading used by the fund.
In practice, of course, there would be no explicit recognition of the pension plan
condition in the sale of a home or business. Then Mr. C and Ms. F would be back in the situation
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where each bears a risk commensurate with his or her share of the rewards, and the equity
investment conveys no advantage that they couldn’t achieve in their personal portfolios. A
pension deficit large enough to threaten the finances of the governmental sponsor, however,
might get enough publicity to affect the sale price. Pension surplus is less likely to attract such
attention. To the extent that Mr. C’s home or business sale price is more likely to be charged for
deficits than rewarded for surplus, pension fund equity market risk is unfavorable to Mr. C.
Cases 2 and 3 show that the pension plan does not reduce equity risk by spreading it
over a finite number of different taxpayer generations. Each generation must bear the risks that
correspond to its potential risk premiums. If one bears a lesser share of risk than of risk
premiums, another must bear more risk; there must be an intergenerational transfer of risk and
therefore of value. The essential lesson here is the futility of trying to spread risk across
generations for mutual reward.
Investing the pension fund in equities, then, provides no first-order gains (or losses) to all
taxpayers in aggregate. In Section 3, we consider several second-order effects of pension fund
equity market investment.
3. Taxes and other second-order effects
3.1 Modeling the tax effects
The main second-order effect of the pension fund’s equity investment is to increase the
taxpayer’s Federal income taxes. The U.S. taxes bonds more highly than equities and gives
corporations favorable tax treatment for pension funding. Under these conditions, Black (1980)
and Tepper (1981) have shown that it is tax-efficient for corporations to fund their pension plans
fully, to invest the pension fund in bonds, and to shift equity risk to the shareholders’ own
portfolios or elsewhere in the company.

13

Because state and local governments are not subject to Federal income tax, it may appear
that there is no tax advantage to investing their plans in bonds. Black’s method involves
corporate tax deductions and does not apply to governmental plans. But Tepper suggests that the
pension fund asset allocation be offset by the shareholder, and a similar approach works for
public plans. We show below that the taxpayer loses when the governmental pension plan invests
in equities, forcing him to rebalance his overall equity exposure by shifting some of his personal
portfolio from equities to bonds.

Notation and assumptions. We use the following notation and assumptions:
• The taxpayer pays Federal income taxes at an effective rate of τ b on income from bonds and
τ s on equities. Generally, τ b > τ s , because capital gain tax rates are lower than ordinary tax rates
and are not due before gains are realized; currently, dividends are also taxed below ordinary
rates.
• The taxpayer deducts local taxes from Federal taxable income at a marginal rate of τ d (For
taxpayers who cannot deduct local taxes because they use the standard deduction or pay under
the alternative minimum tax, τ d is zero; otherwise it is generally equal to τ b .)
• The actual (stochastic) investment return is s ~
rs on equities and ~
rb on bonds.
• The pension fund shifts $1 from bonds to equities.
• The taxpayer offsets the pension fund equity holdings by selling equities and buying bonds in
his personal portfolio.
Here is the Federal income tax effect on the taxpayer of the overall transaction, reflecting
his exposure to the pension fund and the offsetting change he should make in his personal
portfolio.
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Change in
1. Holdings

Pension Fund
+$1 equity - $1 bonds

Personal Portfolio
($1 bonds - $1 equity)* (1- τ d )/(1- τ s )

2. Total Return

~r − ~
rb
s

( ~rb − ~
rs )*(1- τ d )/(1- τ s )

3. After-tax Effect on
Taxpayer
4. Total of Line 3

(1- τ d )*( ~
rs − ~
rb )

[(1- τ b )* ~
rb -(1- τ s ) ~
rs ]*(1- τ d )/(1- τ s )

~
rb (1- τ d )*( τ s - τ b )/(1- τ s )

Line 1: The pension fund buys $1 of equities and sells $1 of bonds. The taxpayer responds by
buying (1- τ d )/(1- τ s ) of equities and selling the same amount of bonds. The scaling factor (1τ d )/(1- τ s ) reflects the different tax consequences to the taxpayer of gains in the pension fund
and in his personal portfolio. This factor is calculated to leave the taxpayer’s total after-tax
equity exposure unchanged, as Line 4 will show.
Line 2: The pension fund earnings reflect $1 of equities rather than $1 of bonds. The taxpayer’s
personal account reflects the opposite effect, scaled by (1- τ d )/(1- τ s ).
Line 3: We adjust the pension fund earnings to reflect their after-tax cost or value to the
taxpayer, whose local government tax (or rebate) for the pension fund is deductible (or taxable)
on his Federal tax return. We similarly tax-adjust the change in his personal portfolio return.
Line 4: Note that ~
rs does not appear. This shows that the taxpayer has hedged the pension fund
transaction and restored his previous risk level. The total effect on the shareholder’s net income
is negative, because τ b > τ s and the other factors are positive. (On a mark-to-market basis, ~
rb
may be negative in any one year, but on a hedging portfolio held to maturity it must be positive
over its horizon.)

15

This illustration shows that the taxpayer loses when the public plan invests in equities.
The Internal Revenue Code provides a tax shelter for the taxpayer to fund the local pension plan,
and the taxpayer would prefer to use that shelter for highly taxed securities like taxable bonds,
not lightly taxed securities like municipal bonds or equities.
Note that this illustration assumes that the taxpayer experiences the full impact of any
pension fund gains and losses – in other words, full exposure. If some portion of those gains and
losses is borne by other taxpayer generations, the taxpayer should scale down the adjustment in
his personal portfolio that offsets the pension fund equity investment. For example, if the
taxpayer expects to bear half of the current year gain or loss, he should only adjust his personal
portfolio by half the amount indicated in the table, and the tax disadvantage of the pension fund
equity investment is halved.

3.2 Other second-order effects
Surplus Sharing. Another second-order effect that works against pension fund investment in
equities is the potential for employee claims on plan surplus. In many public plans, employees
make substantial contributions. Even the employer contributions are arguably their money from
the start, representing deferrals of their compensation into the pension fund. Therefore,
employees may contend, they are entitled to the lion’s share of any investment gains, in the form
of pension or salary increases.
Employers and taxpayers can respond that surplus produced by risk-taking should belong
to the risk bearer, regardless of the source of the funds. With no default risk, taxpayers are bound
to make up for any losses, so they should reap the rewards of any gains. On the other hand, there
are instances in which employees have had to share the cost of disappointing investment
performance, through higher employee contributions or benefit changes (such as COLA
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restrictions). Whatever its merits, the employees’ claim to a share of the surplus has considerable
traction and is often written explicitly in the pension plan.
We have shown that taxpayers have no preference in terms of gross investment returns
between holding equities in their personal portfolio and holding them by proxy in the pension
plan. In their personal portfolios, they bear all losses, and they have an undisputed claim to all
gains. If they are fully responsible for pension fund losses, but have only a diluted share of the
gains, they will have a strong preference for taking their equity exposure directly and their bond
exposure in the pension fund.
Governmental Borrowing Cost. We have assumed that the pensions are not subject to default
risk – a comfortable assumption based on the historical record. The debt of governmental entities
below the Federal level, though, does carry credit risk, raising the debt service cost borne by
taxpayers.
With the transparency that we assume, rating agencies and creditors should recognize that
pension plan investment in the equity market increases the risk of the sponsor’s bonds.
Governments whose pension plans invest in equities should expect to pay higher interest rates on
their borrowing. There is no analogous effect for the taxpayer’s personal investment in equities.
To the extent that creditors’ recognition of the pension plan risk is impressionistic rather
than explicit, an asymmetry may further argue against pension fund equity investment. As we
observed in connection with the handoff between the current and future taxpayers, a large
pension deficit would attract far more attention than a comparable surplus. The credit rating
penalty of poor equity performance may far outweigh the reward of good performance.
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Indulgence in pension fund equity investment is particularly dangerous for local
governments whose tax revenues are also tied closely to the performance of the equity markets.
New York City is a prime example.
Access to Equity Investments. We have argued that taxpayers should not want their local
governmental plan to invest in equities, because they can hold equities more efficiently through
their personal portfolios. But some taxpayers may not have sufficient personal assets to invest.
It is likely, though, that taxpayers without investment assets should not be running equity
risk through the public plan. These taxpayers are already heavily exposed to the equity markets,
because their future employment income is likely to be quite sensitive to the same economic
factors that affect the performance of the equity markets.
Pension Plan Put. We should mention one other second-order effect that differs between
corporate and public pension plans. One advantage of equity investing by corporate pension
funds is that it increases the value of the “pension plan put”. This refers to the possibility that if
the employer fails, pension plan losses will be absorbed not by the shareholders who stood to
gain from the equity market risk, but by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation or by
participants (through reductions in their nonguaranteed pensions) 3 . Whatever the merits of this
argument for corporate pension plan investment in equities – and they are dubious – they do not
fit the public plan context, where there is no PBGC and (we have assumed) no defaults on
pensions promised to employees.
4. Obstacles to Investing Public Plans Exclusively in Bonds
We have not touched on the many practical obstacles to all-bond investment by public
funds, even if the theoretical argument is accepted. Future generations, who bear the risks of
current policies, do not have current votes, and opaque accounting obscures the view of those
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who would do right by those future generations. Elected politicians of course prefer low taxes
now, leaving the risk of tax increases as a problem for their successors.
Some of these obstacles are being cleared right now. The absence of transparency in
pension plans is not an eterna l fact of life; it is largely a matter of accounting rules. Projects
currently underway at the FASB and IASB are likely to improve corporate pension accounting
standards dramatically. The resulting transparency should facilitate a significant equity-to-bond
shift in corporate pension plan assets during the next decade.
Both the transparency of corporate pension finance and the investment restructuring are
certain to affect the public plan sector, even if the GASB does not respond quickly. The current
low level of taxpayer focus on the financing of their public pension plans may not long endure,
especially if they learn that they are giving away $377 pensions for $215.
5. What should a public plan sponsor do about this today?
Public plan sponsors need to understand the concepts developed in Section 2, which
demonstrate that current actuarial costing methods are undervaluing promises made by public
plans to employees. With this understanding comes a dilemma. If the sponsor immediately shifts
to bonds, or directs the plan’s actuary to use near risk- free discount rates, the contribution
demands on current taxpayers will skyrocket. If, on the other hand, business continues as usual,
public employees will continue to trade small wage reductions for more valuable pension
benefits.
A sponsor may want to stop giving pension bargains but may feel that the bargains
already given cannot be paid for by ambushing current taxpayers. Fortunately for such a sponsor,
the slow process that will begin with accounting changes in the private sector is not likely to be
widely perceived in the public sector for a number of years. These years should be used to ease
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the pain. The sponsor who prioritizes stopping the largesse will put up strict barriers to benefit
improvements for existing employees (other than those already attached to future service and
salaries). Refusing to trade new benefits for anything less than their full value in wage
concessions is the key. Where possible, establishing new tiers (effectively separate plans) for
new hires should be considered. The new tier contributions may be invested in liability- matching
bonds to justify, under current actuarial rules, full funding for these benefits. 4
Today’s taxpayers still need to share the historic under-pricing with future taxpayers by
continuing the current mis-pricing of existing benefit promises through as long a transition
period as the system will bear. A sponsor may anticipate the impact of future transparency by
steadily shifting the asset allocation to bonds over an extended transition period. The key
balancing act here is to be ahead of the curve compared to other public plans, not too far behind
the private sector, and always attentive to the rising sun of transparency. Sponsors who act too
swiftly may disrupt the contribution stability on which their overall taxing and spending plans
rely, thereby shocking their financial position, discouraging employees and taxpayers and
driving off new residents and businesses. Sponsors who delay too long may postpone the damage
but will pay the price for giving away unaffordable promises and for holding equities at a time
when vast amounts of other pension money were moving from equities to bonds.
5.1 The “natural” pension investment
Because equity has dominated public pension portfolios for many years, a shift to bonds
is seen as a radical departure from the “natural” investment policy. But is equity really a more
natural pension fund investment than bonds?
Suppose that a government is initially paying its employees all cash, with no pension
plan. Then the government and employees negotiate a pension plan. Under the plan, the
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employees’ salaries are reduced by specified amounts, with the reductions diverted to the
pension fund. There they are invested in riskless liability- matching bonds, and the employees
receive the proceeds when they retire – no more, no less. Clearly, taxpayers should be indifferent
to the implementation of this plan; they are in exactly the same position they were in previously.
Now, suppose the government decides to swap the pension plan bonds for equities. This
decision clearly changes the exposure of taxpayers from neutral to speculative. Given that
taxpayers can make and implement this choice privately, we may well ask why taxpayers would want
their government to do so for them.

6. Conclusion
Current funding and investment practices are costing taxpayers dearly. We are not
directly addressing the losses of the past few years, which we can all hope are temporary, but the
poor decision-making that stems from failure to understand the risks of equity investment. For
example:
• Governments issue pension obligation bonds to capture what they mistakenly believe is an
arbitrage gain from the excess of expected pension fund returns over their borrowing cost. There
is no real economic gain, only some profits for investment bankers, lower costs for current
taxpayers, and additional risk borne by future taxpayers (Gold 2000).
• Governments under-price employees’ pensions by anticipating risk premiums, and they share
“excess” risk premiums earned with employees, further loading risks onto taxpayers for which
they stand to earn no rewards.
• Intergenerational risk-sharing is thwarted by each taxpayer generation’s inclination to take
winnings off the table and let the losses ride.
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Risk has a cost, a cost that is overlooked by current accounting and actuarial standards
and therefore by most public plan stakeholders. Correct recognition of that cost would greatly
alter much public plan practice and improve the lot of tomorrow’s taxpayers.
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Endnotes
1

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards

Board (IASB) are currently developing such pension accounting standards.
2

More likely, surplus would not be removed from the plan but would be used to reduce

contributions made in respect of future additional benefit accruals, reducing the taxes needed to
support the plan.
3
4

Sharpe (1976).
We recognize the danger that pub lic employee groups may reject properly priced defined

benefits in favor of inadequately understood defined contribution plans, based on the optimistic
projections of the mutual fund industry. But mis-pricing defined benefits to compete with
misrepresented defined contributions is not an appropriate response.

